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Abstract
Active re-identification attacks constitute a serious threat to privacy-preserving
social graph publication, because of the ability of active adversaries to leverage fake
accounts, a.k.a. sybil nodes, to enforce structural patterns that can be used to re-
identify their victims on anonymised graphs. Several formal privacy properties have
been enunciated with the purpose of characterising the resistance of a graph against
active attacks. However, anonymisation methods devised on the basis of these prop-
erties have so far been able to address only restricted special cases, where the adver-
saries are assumed to leverage a very small number of sybil nodes. In this paper we
present a new probabilistic interpretation of active re-identification attacks on social
graphs. Unlike the aforementioned privacy properties, which model the protection
from active adversaries as the task of making victim nodes indistinguishable in terms
of their fingerprints with respect to all potential attackers, our new formulation in-
troduces a more complete view, where the attack is countered by jointly preventing
the attacker from retrieving the set of sybil nodes, and from using these sybil nodes
for re-identifying the victims. Under the new formulation, we show that the privacy
property k-symmetry, introduced in the context of passive attacks, provides a suffi-
cient condition for the protection against active re-identification attacks leveraging an
arbitrary number of sybil nodes. Moreover, we show that the algorithm K-Match,
originally devised for efficiently enforcing the related notion of k-automorphism, also
guarantees k-symmetry. Empirical results on several collections of synthetic graphs
corroborate that our approach allows, for the first time, to publish anonymised social
graphs (with formal privacy guarantees) that effectively resist the strongest active re-
identification attack reported in the literature, even when it leverages a large number
of sybil nodes.
Keywords: private social graph publication, anonymisation, active adversaries
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1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a formidable explosion in the use of social networking sites.
Although the discipline of social network analysis has existed already for quite some time,
today’s scientists potentially have access as never before to massive amounts of social
network data. Social graphs are a particular example of this type of data, in which ver-
tices typically represent users (e.g. Facebook or Twitter users, e-mail addresses) and edges
represent relations between these users (e.g. becoming “friends”, following someone, ex-
changing e-mails). The analysis of social graphs can help scientists and other actors to
discover important societal trends, study consumption habits, understand the spread of
news or diseases, etc. For these goals to be achievable, it is necessary that the holders
of this information, e.g. online social networks, messaging services, among others, release
samples of their social graphs. However, ethical considerations, increased public awareness,
and reinforced legislation1 place an increasingly strong emphasis on the need to protect
individuals’ privacy via anonymisation.
Social graphs have proven themselves a challenging data type to anonymise. Even a
simple undirected graph, with arbitrary node labels and no attributes on vertices or edges,
is susceptible of leaking private information, due to the existence of unique structural
patterns that characterise some individuals, e.g. the number of friends or the relations in
the immediate vicinity [31]. Many privacy attacks that solely rely on the underlying graph
topology of the social graph exist [1], and they are still effective [28], despite advances on
social graph anonymisation. A particularly effective privacy attack is the so-called active
attack, which uses a strategy consisting in inserting fake accounts, commonly referred to
as sybils, into the real network. Once inserted, these fake users interact with legitimate
users and among themselves, and create structures that allow the adversary to retrieve the
sybil nodes from a sanitised social graph and use the connection patterns between sybils
and legitimate nodes to re-identify the original users and infer sensitive information about
them, such as the existence of relations.
The publication of social graphs that effectively resist active attacks was initially ad-
dressed by Trujillo-Rasua and Yero [40]. They introduced the notion of (k, `)-anonymity,
the first privacy property to explicitly model the protection of published graphs against
active adversaries. A graph satisfying (k, `)-anonymity ensures that an adversary leverag-
ing up to ` sybil nodes and knowing the pairwise distances of all victims to all sybil nodes,
is still unable to distinguish each victim from at least k − 1 other vertices in the graph.
This privacy property served as the basis for defining several anonymisation methods for a
particular case, namely the one where either k > 1 or ` > 1 [29, 26]. In other words, non-
trivial anonymity (k > 1) was only guaranteed against an adversary leveraging exactly one
sybil node. Later, the introduction of the notion of (k, `)-adjacency anonymity [27] allowed
to arbitrarily increase the values of k for which a formal privacy guarantee can be provided,
but the proposed methods remained unable to address scenarios where the adversary can
1For example, the European GDPR, which can be consulted at https://ec.
europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/
2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en.
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leverage more than two sybil nodes. In consequence, until now no anonymisation method
with theoretically sound privacy guarantees against active attackers leveraging three or
more sybil nodes has been made available to data publishers.
To remedy the aforementioned situation, in this paper we take a different approach to
the problem of anonymising a graph that may have been victim of an active attack. Our
approach differs from the ones based on (k, `)-(adjacency) anonymity in the fact that it
quantifies the combined probability of success of the attacker in re-identifying her sybil
nodes and using them to re-identify the victims, whereas (k, `)-(adjacency) anonymity-
based methods implicitly assume that the adversary cannot be prevented from retrieving
the sybil nodes, and (over-)compensate for this by quantifying the probability that victims
are re-identified in terms of any vertex subset satisfying some minimal constraints. Our
new approach leverages a new probabilistic interpretation of the adversary’s success prob-
ability in the two stages of re-identification. This new formulation allowed us to point out
some mismatches between the goal of privacy-preserving publication, namely ensuring some
upper bound on the probability of each victim being re-identified, and the actual guaran-
tees provided by existing privacy properties. As an interesting observation, we noticed that
there exist graphs that, despite failing to satisfy existing formal privacy properties, are in
fact secure against active attackers. More importantly, our new formulation allowed us
to prove that k-symmetry [44], an existing privacy property originally introduced for the
scenario of passive attacks, i.e. attacks that do not use sybil accounts, guarantees an 1/k
upper bound on the re-identification probability of each victim, regardless of the number of
sybil nodes used by the adversary. This finding is of paramount importance, as it enables
the use of any known anonymisation method ensuring k-symmetry for preventing active
re-identification attacks via sybil subgraph obfuscation. In this sense, we additionally show
that the algorithm K-Match [48], originally devised for efficiently enforcing the notion of
k-automorphism, also provides a sufficient condition for ensuring k-symmetry.
Summary of contributions:
• We show that no privacy property in the literature characterises all anonymous graphs
with respect to active attacks.
• We introduce a general definition of resistance to active attacks that can be used to
analyse the actual resistance of a graph.
• We use the introduced privacy model to prove that k-symmetry, the strongest notion
of anonymity against passive attacks, also protects against active attacks.
• Of independent interest is our proof that k-automorphism does not protect against
active attacks. This is a surprising result, considering that k-automorphism and
k-symmetry have traditionally been deemed as conceptually equivalent.
• We prove that the algorithm K-Match, devised to ensure a sufficient condition for
k-automorphism, also guarantees k-symmetry.
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• We provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of K-Match as an anonymisation
strategy against the strongest active attack reported in the literature, namely the
robust active attack presented in [28], even when it leverages a large number of sybil
nodes.
Structure of the paper. We discuss related work in Section 2, and describe our new
probabilistic interpretation of the adversarial model for active re-identification attacks in
Section 3. Then we discuss the applicability of k-symmetry for modelling protection against
active attackers in Section 4, and show in Section 5 that the algorithm K-Match efficiently
provides a sufficient condition for k-symmetry. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the
effectiveness of K-Match against the robust active attack from [28] in Section 6 and give
our conclusions in Section 7.
2 Related work
In this paper we focus on a particular family of properties for privacy-preserving publica-
tion of social graphs: those based on the notion of k-anonymity [38, 39]. These privacy
properties depend on assumptions about the type of knowledge that a malicious agent,
the adversary, possesses. According to this criterion, adversaries can be divided into two
types. On the one hand, passive adversaries rely on information that can be collected from
public sources, such as public profiles in online social networks, where a majority of users
keep unmodified default privacy settings that pose no access restrictions on friend lists and
other types of information. A passive adversary attempts to re-identify users in a pub-
lished social graph by matching this information to the released data. On the other hand,
active adversaries not only use publicly available information, but also attempt to interact
with the real social network before the data is published, with the purpose of forcing the
occurrence of unique structural patterns that can be retrieved after publication and used
for learning sensitive information.
k-anonymity models against passive attacks. k-anonymity is based on a notion of
indistinguishability between users in a dataset, which is used to create equivalence classes
of users that are pair-wise indistinguishable to the eyes of an attacker. Formally, given a
symmetric, reflexive and transitive indistinguishability relation ∼ on the users of a graph
G, G satisfies k-anonymity with respect to ∼ if and only if the equivalence class with
respect to ∼ of each user in G has cardinality at least k.
Several graph-oriented notions of indistinguishably appear in the literature. For exam-
ple, Liu and Terzi [21] consider two users indistinguishable if they have the same degree.
Their model is known as k-degree anonymity and gives protection against attackers capa-
ble of accurately estimating the number of connections of a user. The notion of k-degree
anonymity has been widely studied, and numerous anonymisation methods based on it
have been proposed, e.g. [22, 4, 10, 42, 23, 36, 34, 5]. Zhou and Pei [47] assume a stronger
attacker able to determine not only the connections of a user u, but also whether u’s friends
(i.e. those users that u is connected to) are connected. This means that the adversary is
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assumed to know the induced subgraphs created by the users and their neighbours. It is
simple to see that Zhou and Pei’s model, known as k-neighbourhood anonymity, is stronger
than k-degree anonymity.
The notion of k-automorphism [48] was introduced with the goal of modelling the
knowledge of any passive adversary. Two users u and v in a graph G are said to be au-
tomorphically equivalent, or indistinguishable, if ϕ(u) = v for some automorphism ϕ in
G. The notion of k-automorphism ensures that every vertex in the graph is automor-
phically equivalent to k − 1 other vertices. Although k-automorphism itself does not in
general imply all other privacy properties (as we will show in Appendix A), the method
proposed in [48] for enforcing the (stronger) k different matches principle does achieve this
goal. Similar formulations of indistinguishability in terms of graph automorphisms were
presented independently in the work on k-symmetry [44] and k-isomorphism [9]. While k-
symmetry and k-automorphism have traditionally been viewed as equivalent, k-symmetry
is actually stronger, and it does imply all other privacy properties for passive attacks. In
this paper, we additionally show that, in the context of active attacks, k-symmetry always
guarantees a 1/k upper bound on the re-identification probability for each vertex, which
k-automorphism does not.
A natural trade-off between the strength of the privacy notions and the amount of
structural disruption caused by the anonymisation methods based on them has been em-
pirically demonstrated in [48]. The three privacy models described above form a hierarchy,
which is displayed in the left branch of Figure 1. Privacy models tailored to active attacks
also form a hierarchy, displayed in the right branch of Figure 1, which we describe next.
Interrogation marks in Figure 1 indicate that connections between properties tailored for
passive attacks and those tailored for active attacks have not been established yet, neither
directly nor via some additional property.
k-anonymity models against active attacks. Backstrom et al. were the first to show
the impact of active attacks in social networks back in 2007 [2]. Their attack has been
optimised a number of times, see [32, 33, 28], and two privacy models particularly tai-
lored to measure the resistance of social graphs to this type of attack have been recently
proposed [40, 27]. The first of those models is (k, `)-anonymity, introduced in 2016 by
Trujillo-Rasua and Yero [40]. They consider adversaries capable of re-identifying their own
sets of sybil nodes in the anonymised graph. Adversaries are also assumed to know or able
to estimate the distances of the victims to the set of sybil nodes. This last assumption was
weakened later in [27] by restricting the adversary’s knowledge to distances between vic-
tims and sybil nodes of length one. That is, the adversary only knows whether the victim
is connected to a sybil node. That restriction led to a weaker version of (k, `)-anonymity
called (k, `)-adjacency anonymity, as displayed in Figure 1.
There exist three anonymisation algorithms [29, 26, 27] that aim to create graphs
satisfying (k, `)-(adjacency) anonymity. Their approach consists in determining a candidate
set of sybil vertices in the original graph that breaks the desired anonymity property, and
forcing via graph transformation that every vertex has a common pattern of connections
with the sybil vertices shared by at least k − 1 other vertices. A common shortcoming
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Figure 1: A hierarchy of privacy properties. An arrow has the standard logical interpreta-
tion, i.e. P =⇒ P ′ means that a graph satisfying P also satisfies P ′. Left side: models
for passive attacks. Right side: models for active attacks. Interrogation marks indicate
connections that have not been established yet.
of these methods is that they only provide formal guarantees against attackers leveraging
a very small number of sybil nodes (no more than two). This limitation seems to be
an inherent shortcoming of the entire family of properties of which (k, `)-anonymity and
(k, `)-adjacency anonymity are members. Indeed, for large values of `, which are required
in order to account for reasonably capable adversaries, anonymisation methods based on
this type of property face the problem that any change introduced in the original graph to
render one vertex indistinguishable from others, in terms of its distances to a vertex subset,
is likely to render this vertex unique in terms of its distances to other vertex subsets.
An approach that has been used against both types of attack, passive and active,
consists in randomly perturbing the graph. While intuition suggests that the task of re-
identification becomes harder for the adversary as the amount of random noise added
to a graph grows, no theoretically sound privacy guarantees have been provided for this
scenario. Moreover, it has been shown in [28] that active attacks can be made robust
against reasonably large amounts of random perturbation.
Other privacy models. For the sake of completeness, we finish this brief literature survey
by mentioning privacy models that aim to quantify the probability that the adversary learns
any sort of sensitive information. A popular example is differential privacy (DP) [11], a
semantic privacy notion which, instead of anonymising the dataset, focuses on the methods
accessing the sensitive data, and provides a quantifiable privacy guarantee against an
adversary who knows all but one entry in the dataset. In the context of graph data, the
notion of two datasets differing by exactly one entry can have multiple interpretations, the
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two most common being edge-differential privacy and vertex-differential privacy. While a
number of queries, e.g. degree sequences [18, 14] and subgraph counts [46, 17], have been
addressed under (edge-)differential privacy, the use of this notion for numerous very basic
queries, e.g. graph diameter, remains a challenge. Recently, differentially private methods
leveraging the randomized response strategy for publishing a graph’s adjacency matrix
were proposed in [37]. While these methods do not necessarily view vertex ids as sensitive,
data holders whose goal in preventing re-identification attacks is to prevent the adversary
from learning the existence of relations may view this approach as an alternative to k-
anonymity-based methods. Another DP-based alternative to k-anonymity-based methods
consists in learning the parameters of a graph generative model under differential privacy
and then using this model to publish synthetic graphs that resemble the original one in
some structural properties [30, 35, 43, 45, 16, 8].
Other privacy models rely on the notion of adversary’s prior belief, defined as a prob-
ability distribution on sensitive values. For example, t-closeness [20] measures attribute
protection in terms of the distance between the distribution of sensitive values in the
anonymised dataset with respect to the distribution of sensitive attribute values in the
original table. Such definition of prior belief is different to other works, such as (ρ1, ρ2)-
privacy [13] and -privacy [24], where prior belief represents the adversary’s knowledge in
the absence of knowledge about the dataset. In either case, estimating the prior belief of
the adversary is challenging, as discussed in [11].
Concluding remarks. As illustrated in Figure 1, the development of k-anonymity models
against passive and active attacks have been traditionally split and had no apparent inter-
section. This article provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first connection between
the two developments. This is achieved by introducing a probabilistic model for active
attacks that characterises all graphs that resists active attacks, of which k-symmetry and
(k, `)-anonymity are proven to be sufficient, yet not necessary, conditions.
3 Probabilistic adversarial model
Our adversarial model is a generalisation of the model introduced in [28], which captures the
capabilities of an active attacker and allows one to analyse the resistance of anonymisation
methods to active attacks. Such analysis is expressed as a three-step game between the
attacker and the defender. In the first step the attacker is allowed to interact with the
network, insert sybil accounts, and establish links with other users (called the victims). The
defender uses the second step to anonymise and perturb the network, which was previously
manipulated by the attacker. Lastly, the attacker receives the anonymised network and
makes a guess on the pseudonyms used to anonymise the victims. Each of these steps is
formalised in what follows.
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Figure 2: An active re-identification attack viewed as an attacker-defender game.
3.1 Attacker subgraph creation
The attacker-defender game starts with a graph G = (V,E) representing a snapshot of a
social network, as in Figure 2(a). The attacker knows a subset of the users, called the
victims and denoted I, but not the connections between them. The attacker is allowed to
insert a set of sybil nodes S into G and establish connections with their victims.
This step of the attack transforms the original graph G = (V,E) into a graph G+ =
(V ′, E ′) satisfying the following two properties: i) V ′ = V ∪ S and ii) E ′ \ E ⊆ (S × S) ∪
(S × I) ∪ (I × S). The second condition says that relations established by the adversary
are constrained to the set of sybil and victim nodes. We call the resulting graph G+ the
sybil-extended graph of G. An example of a sybil-extended graph is depicted in Figure 2(b).
The attacker does not know the entire graph G+, unless the original graph was empty.
The adversary knows, however, the subgraph formed by the set of sybil nodes S, their
connections to the victims, and the victim set I. This notion of adversary knowledge is
formalised next.
Definition 1 (Adversary knowledge). Let G = (V,E) be an original graph and G+ =
(V ∪ S,E ′) the sybil-extended graph created by an adversary that targets a set of victims
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I ⊆ V . The adversary knowledge is defined as the subgraph GS,I of G defined by
GS,I = (S ∪ I, {(u, v) ∈ E | {u, v} ⊆ S ∪ I ∧ {u, v} 6⊆ I})
Note that connections between victims are not part of the adversary knowledge.
3.2 Pseudonymisation and perturbation
When the defender decides to publish the graph G+, she pseudonymises it by replacing
the real user identities with pseudonyms. That is to say, the defender obtains G+ and
constructs an isomorphism ϕ from G+ to ϕG+. An isomorphism between two graphs
G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E ′) is a bijective function ϕ : V → V ′, such that ∀v1, v2 ∈
V : (v1, v2) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (ϕ(v1), ϕ(v2)) ∈ E ′. Two graphs are isomorphic, denoted by
G 'ϕ G′, or briefly G ' G′, if there exists an isomorphism ϕ between them. Given
a subset of vertices S ⊆ V , we will often use ϕS to denote the set {ϕ(v)|v ∈ S}. In
Figure 2(c) we illustrate a pseudonymisation of the graph in Figure 2(b).
We call ϕG+ the pseudonymised graph. Pseudonymisation serves the purpose of re-
moving personally identifiable information from the graph. Because pseudonymisation is
insufficient to protect a graph against re-identification, the defender is also allowed to per-
turb the graph. This is captured by a non-deterministic procedure t that maps graphs to
graphs. The procedure t modifies ϕG+, resulting in the transformed graph t(ϕG+). We
assume that t(ϕG+) is ultimately made available to the public, hence it is known to the
adversary.
3.3 Re-identification
The last step of the attacker-defender game is where the attacker analyses the published
graph t(ϕG+) to re-identify her own sybil accounts and the victims (see Figure 2(d)). This
allows her to acquire new information, which was supposed to remain private, such as the
fact that E and F are friends.
We define the output of the adversary re-identification attempt as a mapping ρ from
the set of vertices S ∪ I to the set of vertices in t(ϕG+). This represents the adversary’s
belief on the pseudonyms used to anonymise the attacker and victim vertices in t(ϕG+). To
account for uncertainty on the adversary’s belief, we consider that the adversary assigns a
probability value p(ρ) to each mapping, denoting the probability that the adversary chooses
ρ as the output of the re-identification attack. Let ΦS,I be the universe of mappings from
the set of vertices in S ∪ I to the set t(ϕG+). The law of total probability allows us to
quantify the adversary’s probability of success in re-identifying one victim as follows.
Proposition 1. Let G = (V,E) be an original graph, G+ = (V ∪ S,E ′) the sybil-extended
graph created by an adversary that targets a set of victims I ⊆ V , and t(ϕG+) the
anonymised version of G+ created by the defender. Then, the probability AS,It(ϕG+)(u) that
the adversary successfully re-identifies a victim u ∈ I in t(ϕG+) is
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AS,It(ϕG+)(u) =
∑
ρ∈ΦS,I ,ρ(u)=ϕ(u)
p(ρ). (1)
In our analyses, we restrict the function p to be a probability distribution on the domain
ΦS,I , i.e.
∑
ρ∈ΦS,I p(ρ) = 1. We also assume that p satisfies the standard random worlds
assumption enunciated in [6, 25], which expresses that, in the absence of any information in
addition to t(ϕG+), any two isomorphic subgraphs in t(ϕG+) are indistinguishable for the
adversary. We enunciate the random worlds assumption next, adapting the terminology
to the one used in this paper.
Assumption 1 (Random worlds assumption [6, 25]). Let G = (V,E) be an original graph,
G+ = (V ∪ S,E ′) the sybil-extended graph created by an adversary that targets a set of
victims I ⊆ V , and G′ = t(ϕG+) the anonymised version of G+ created by the defender.
Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two bijective functions from S ∪ I to the set of vertices VG′ in G′. Let
G′ρ1S,ρ1I and G
′
ρ2S,ρ2I
be the two attacker subgraphs in G′ that correspond to the adversary’s
guesses ρ1 and ρ2, respectively. If G
′
ρ1S,ρ1I
and G′ρ2S,ρ2I are isomorphic, then p(ρ1) = p(ρ2).
In the remainder of this article, we will analyse the effectiveness of various anonymi-
sation procedures by calculating the success probability of the adversary based on Propo-
sition 1, and we will often resort to Assumption 1 when reasoning about the adversary’s
belief ρ.
4 Applicability of current privacy properties against
active attacks
In this section we make, to the best of our knowledge, the first connection between passive
and active attacks by formally proving that k-symmetry provides protection against active
attacks. We also prove that k-symmetry is incomplete, just like (k, `)-anonymity, in the
sense that none of them characterises all anonymous graphs with respect to active attacks.
Last, but not least, we show that neither k-symmetry implies (k, `)-anonymity, nor the
other way around.
4.1 k-symmetry: an effective privacy model against active at-
tacks
We use the introduced privacy model to prove that k-symmetry, the strongest notion of
anonymity against passive attacks, also protects against active attacks.
Definition 2 (k-symmetry [44]). Let ΓG be the universe of automorphisms in G. Two
vertices u and v in G are said to be automorphically equivalent, denoted u ∼= v, if there exists
an automorphism γ ∈ ΓG such that γ(u) = v. Because the relation ∼= is an equivalence
relation in the set of vertices of G, let [u]∼= be the equivalence class of u. G is said to satisfy
k-symmetry if for every vertex u it holds that |[u]∼=| ≥ k.
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Theorem 1. Let G′ = (V ′, E ′) be an original graph, G+ = (V ′ ∪ S,E ′) the sybil-extended
graph created by an adversary that targets a set of victims I ⊆ V ′, and t(ϕG+) = (V,E)
the anonymised version of G+ created by the defender. If t(ϕG+) satisfies k-symmetry,
then for every vertex u ∈ I the probability of the adversary guessing the output of ϕ(u) is
lower than or equal to 1/k.
Proof. Let G be a shorthand notation for t(ϕG+). Let ΦS,I be the universe of mappings
from the set of vertices in S ∪ I to the set of vertices in G. We define a relation ∼ between
adversary’s guesses in ΦS,I by
ρ ∼ ρ′ ⇐⇒ GρS,ρI ' Gρ′S,ρ′I
Because ' is an equivalence relation, it follows that ∼ is also an equivalence relation.
We use ΦS,I/∼ to denote the partition of ΦS,I into the set of equivalence classes with respect
to ∼, and [ρ]∼ to denote the equivalence class containing ρ. Consider, given a victim u,
a successful adversary guess ρ0 ∈ ΦS,I , i.e. a mapping satisfying that ρ0(u) = ϕ(u). Our
first proof step is about showing that there exist k− 1 other mappings ρ1, . . . , ρk−1 in [ρ]∼
satisfying that
∀i, j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} : i 6= j =⇒ ρi(u) 6= ρj(u). (2)
Let ρ0(u) = v. Because G satisfies k-symmetry, it follows that there exist k−1 different
vertices {v1, . . . , vk−1} that are automorphically equivalent to v. That is to say, there exist
k − 1 automorphisms γ1, . . . , γk−1 in ΓG such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} : γi(v) = vi 6= v.
Now, consider the mappings ρi : S ∪ I → Si ∪ Ii defined by ρi = γi ◦ ρ0, for every i ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1}. On the one hand, given that γ1, · · · , γk−1 are automorphisms, it follows
that GS0,I0 'γi GSi,Ii , for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, which implies that ρ0 ∼ ρi. On the
other hand, ρi(u) = ui 6= uj = ρj(u) for every i 6= j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. This allows us to
conclude that ρ0, . . . , ρk−1 are pairwise different and that {ρ0, . . . , ρk−1} ⊆ [ρ]∼.
Our second proof step consists of showing that, given two mappings ρ0 and ρ
′
0 in
ΦS,I such that ρ0(u) = ρ
′
0(u) = v, and the mappings {ρ1, . . . , ρk−1} and {ρ′1, . . . , ρ′k−1}
constructed as previously, it holds that
ρ0 6= ρ′0 =⇒ ρi 6= ρ′j ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Let x ∈ S ∪ I such that ρ0(x) 6= ρ′0(x). Take any two integers i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. We
analyse two cases.
Case 1 (i = j). Let ρ0(x) = y and ρ
′
0(x) = y
′. By construction, ρi(x) = γi(ρ0(x)) = γi(y)
and ρ′i(x) = γi(ρ
′
0(x)) = γi(y
′). The fact that γi is a bijective function and that y 6= y′
gives that γi(y) 6= γi(y′), which implies that ρi 6= ρ′i.
Case 2 (i 6= j). Observe that ρi(u) = γi(ρ0(u)) = γi(v) = vi and ρ′j(u) = γj(ρ′0(u)) =
γj(v) = vj. Because vi 6= vj it follows that ρi(u) 6= ρ′j(u), hence ρi 6= ρ′j.
The last proof step consists of using the formula to calculate adversary success to obtain
a probability bound. The adversary’s probability of success in re-identifying a victim u ∈ I
is calculated by,
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∑
ρ∈ΦS,I ,ρ(u)=ϕ(u)
p(ρ).
Let ρ01, . . . , ρ
0
n be all functions in ΦS,I satisfying ρ
0
1(u) = ρ
0
2(u) = · · · = ρ0n(u) = ϕ(u).
It follows that the probability of success of the adversary is equal to p(ρ01) + · · · + p(ρ0n).
Now, for each ρi, consider the mappings ρ
1
i , . . . , ρ
k−1
i defined by ρ
j
i = ϕj ◦ ρ0i , for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Previously we proved the following two intermediate results.
1. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set {ρ0i , ρ1i , . . . , ρk−1i } ⊆ ΦS,I has cardinality k and its
elements satisfy ρ0i ∼ ρ1i ∼ . . . ∼ ρk−1i .
2. ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} =⇒ {ρ0i , ρ1i , . . . , ρk−1i } ∩ {ρ0j , ρ1j , . . . , ρk−1j } = ∅.
The second result and the fact that p is a probability distributions gives,∑
i∈{1,...,n}
∑
j∈{0,...,k−1}
p(ρji ) ≤ 1.
We use the first result and the random worlds assumption (Proposition 1) to conclude
that p(ρ0i ) = p(ρ
1
i ) = · · · = p(ρk−1i ), for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, which gives,∑
i∈{1,...,n}
∑
j∈{0,...,k−1}
p(ρji ) =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}
kp(ρ0i ) ≤ 1.
The last inequality states that p(ρ01) + · · ·+ p(ρ0n) ≤ 1/k.
4.2 k-symmetry versus (k, `)-anonymity
As proven in Theorem 1, k-symmetry provides protection against active attacks regardless
of the number of sybil nodes inserted by the attacker, as opposed to (k, `)-anonymity
which uses ` as a parameter on the maximum number of sybil nodes. In spite of that, (k, `)-
anonymity is not weaker than k-symmetry. As we prove next, they are in fact incomparable.
Theorem 2. Let Gk,` be the universe of anonymised graphs such that no adversary with `
sybil nodes or less can re-identify a victim with probability lower or equal than 1/k. There
exist k > 1 and graphs G,G′, G′′ ∈ Gk,` such that:
• G satisfies k-symmetry, but G does not satisfy (k, `)-anonymity for some ` ≥ 1.
• G′ satisfies (k, `)-anonymity for some ` ≥ 1, but G′ does not satisfy k-symmetry.
• G′′ neither satisfy k-symmetry nor (k, `)-anonymity for some ` ≥ 1.
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Proof. Figure 3(a) shows a 2-symmetric graph G which, for 2 ≤ ` ≤ 8, does not satisfy
(k, `)-anonymity for any k > 1. Moreover, Figure 3(b) shows a (2, 1)-anonymous graph
G′ which can be verified not to satisfy k-symmetry for any k > 1. In fact, this graph
even fails to satisfy k-degree anonymity for any k > 1. An example of a graph G′′ proving
the correctness of the last statement is displayed in Figure 3(c). That graph is neither
2-symmetric nor (2, 2)-anonymous.
v1
v2
v3
v4 v5 v6 v7
v8
v9
v10
(a)
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v0 v10
(b)
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
v0 v10
(c)
Figure 3: Example graphs. (a) A 2-symmetric graph not satisfying (k, `)-anonymity for
k > 1 and 2 ≤ ` ≤ 8. (b) A (2, 1)-anonymous graph not satisfying k-symmetry for k > 1.
(c) A graph where the success probability of any active attack leveraging 2 sybil nodes is
at most 1/2, despite the graph neither satisfying (2, 2)-anonymity nor 2-symmetry.
Of independent interest is our proof that k-automorphism [48] does not protect against
active attacks. This is a surprising result, given that k-automorphism and k-symmetry have
traditionally been considered equivalent. We refer the interested reader to Appendix A.
5 Algorithm K-Match guarantees k-symmetry
In this section we prove that the algorithm K-Match, proposed in [48] as a sufficient
condition to achieve k-automorphism, also guarantees k-symmetry. Given a graph G and
a value of k, the K-Match algorithm obtains a supergraph G′ of G satisfying the following
conditions:
1. VG′ ⊇ VG and EG′ ⊇ EG.
2. There exist k − 1 automorphisms γ1, γ2, . . . , γk−1 of G′ such that:
(a) For every v ∈ VG′ and every i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, γi(v) 6= v.
(b) For every v ∈ VG′ and every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, i 6= j ⇐⇒ γi(v) 6= γj(v).
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(c) For every v ∈ VG′ and every i, j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k − 1, γi+j(v) =
γi(γj(v)) = γj(γi(v)), with addition taken modulo k.
To obtain G′, the algorithm first splits the vertices of G′ into k groups and arranges
them in a k-column matrix M called the vertex alignment table (VAT for short). If |VG|
is not a multiple of k, a number of dummy vertices is added to achieve this property. The
VAT is organised in such a manner that the number of graph editions to perform in the
second step of the process is close to the minimum. For convenience, in what follows we
will denote by vij the vertex of G
′ placed in position Mij of the VAT. The second step
of the method consists in adding edges to EG′ in such a way that conditions 2.a to 2.c
are enforced. To that end, for every edge (vij, vpq), all edges of the form (vi,j+t, vp,q+t),
additions modulo k, are added to EG′ if they did not previously exist.
Figure 4 shows an example of a VAT allowing to enforce 3-automorphism on the graph
of Figure 2(b)2. This VAT encodes two functions f1, f2 : VG′ → VG′ :
f1 = {(1, F ), (F,D), (D, 1), (C,A), (A,B), (B,C), (2, 3), (3, E), (E, 2)},
that is, a function such that the image of every element is the one located one column to
its right (modulo 3) on the same row, and
f2 = {(1, D), (F, 1), (D,F ), (C,B), (A,C), (B,A), (2, E), (3, 2), (E, 3)},
that is, a function such that the image of every element is the one located two columns to
its right (modulo 3) on the same row.
1 F D
C A B
2 3 E
Figure 4: An example of a VAT for the graph shown in Figure 2(b).
In general, these functions are not automorphisms of G′ upon creation of the VAT. It is
the second step of the method that will transform them into automorphisms by performing
all necessary edge-copying operations. For example, the edge (C,A) needs to be added to
G′ because (A,B) ∈ EG but (f2(A), f2(B)) = (C,A) /∈ EG; and (A, 3) needs to be added
because (B,E) ∈ EG but (f2(B), f2(E)) = (A, 3) /∈ EG. Once the method is executed,
each automorphism γt, t ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, defined in item 2 above is completely specified
by the VAT, as γt(vij) = vi,j+t, with addition modulo k, for every i ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌈
|VG|
k
⌉}
and
every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We now show the link between the K-Match method and k-symmetry.
2This table is not necessarily the one created by the first step of K-Match, but it serves to illustrate
the second step, which is the one that guarantees the privacy property and will be the basis of the main
result in this section.
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Theorem 3. Let G = (V,E) be a graph and let G′ = (V ′, E ′) the result of applying
algorithm K-Match to G for some parameter k. Then, G′ satisfies k-symmetry.
Proof. Let u ∈ VG′ be an arbitrary vertex of G′, and let v1 = γ1(u), v2 = γ2(u), . . . ,
vk−1 = γk−1(u) be the images of u by the automorphisms γ1, γ2, . . . , γk−1 enforced on G′
by the execution of K-Match. By definition, we have that u ∼= v1 ∼= v2 ∼= . . . ∼= vk−1
and, by conditions 2.a and 2.b, they are pairwise different. Thus, |[u]∼=| = k, hence G′ is
k-symmetric.
The most relevant consequence of Theorem 3 is that algorithm K-Match can also be
used for protecting graphs against active adversaries, as it will ensure that no victim is
re-identified with probability greater than 1/k.
6 Experiments
The purpose of these experiments3 is to demonstrate the effectiveness and usability of k-
symmetry, enforced using the K-Match algorithm, for protecting graphs against active
adversaries leveraging a sufficiently large number of sybil nodes and the strongest attack
strategy reported in the literature, namely the robust active attack introduced in [28]. Ef-
fectiveness is assessed in terms of the success rate measure used in previous works on active
attacks [29, 26, 27, 28], whereas usability is assessed in terms of several structural utility
measures. In what follows, we describe the experimental setting, display the empirical
results obtained and conclude the section with a discussion of these results.
6.1 Experimental setting
In order to make the results reported in this section comparable to previous works on active
attacks and countermeasures against them [27, 28], we study the behaviour of our proposed
method on two types of randomly generated synthetic graphs. In the first case, we use
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random graphs [12]. We generated 200, 000 ER graphs, 10, 000 for each
density value in the set {0.1, 0.15, . . . , 0.95, 1.0}. The second group of synthetic graphs
was generated according to the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [3], which generates scale-
free graphs. We used seed graphs of order 50 and every graph was grown by adding 150
vertices, and performing the corresponding edge additions. The BA model has a parameter
m defining the number of new edges added for every new vertex. We generated 10, 000
graphs for every value of m in the set {5, 10, . . . , 50}. In generating each graph, the type of
the seed graph was randomly selected among the following choices: a complete graph, an
m-regular ring lattice, or an ER random graph of density 0.5. The probability of selecting
each choice was set as 1/3. In both cases, the generated synthetic graphs have 200 nodes.
3We performed our experiments on the HPC platform of the University of Luxembourg [41]. In partic-
ular, we ran our experiments on the Gaia cluster of the UL HPC. A detailed description of the Gaia clus-
ter is available at https://hpc.uni.lu/systems/gaia/. The implementations of the graph generators,
anonymisation methods and attack simulations are available at https://github.com/rolandotr/graph.
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Based on the discussion on the plausible number of sybil nodes in Section 3, we make the
number of sybils ` = dlog2 200e = 8.
We analyse three values for the privacy parameter k: a low value, k = 2; a high
value, k = ` = 8; and an intermediate value, k = 5. For every value of k, we compare
the behaviour of the K-Match algorithm, which ensures k-symmetry, and Mauw et al.’s
algorithm for enforcing (k,ΓG,1)-adjacency anonymity [27]. In order to build the vertex
alignment table, algorithm K-Match requires the vertex set of the input graph to be
partitioned into k subsets such that the number of edges linking vertices in different subsets
is close to the minimum. We used the multilevel k-way partitioning method reported in [19],
in specific its implementation included in the METIS library 4, for efficiently obtaining such
a partition. The effectiveness of the anonymisation methods is measured in terms of their
resistance to the robust active attack described in [28]. Thus, following the attacker-
defender game described in Section 3, for every graph we first run the attacker subgraph
creation stage. Then, for every resulting graph, we obtain the two variants of anonymised
graphs. Finally, for each perturbed graph, we simulate the execution of the re-identification
stage and compute its success rate as defined in [28], that is
SuccessRate =
{ ∑
X∈X pX
|X | if X 6= ∅
0 otherwise
(3)
where X is the set of equally-most-likely sybil subgraphs retrieved in t(ϕG+) by the third
phase of the attack, and
pX =
{ 1
|YX | if Y ∈ YX
0 otherwise
with YX containing all equally-most-likely fingerprint matchings according to X. In order
to obtain the scores used for comparing the effectiveness of the different approaches, we
compute for every method the average of the success rates over every group of 10, 000
graphs sharing the same set of parameter choices.
The anonymisation methods are also compared in terms of utility. To that end, we
measure the distortion caused by each method on a number of global graph statistics,
namely the global clustering coefficient, the averaged local clustering coefficient, and the
similarity between the degree distributions, measured in terms of the cosine of the angle
between the degree vectors, following the approach introduced in [15, 26].
6.2 Results and discussion
Figure 5 shows the success rates of the attack on both random graph collections, whereas
Figures 6, 7 and 8 show utility values in terms of degree distribution similarity, varia-
tion of global clustering coefficient and variation of averaged local clustering coefficient,
respectively.
4Available at http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/views/metis.
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Regarding the effectiveness of the anonymisation methods, the results in Figure 5 clearly
show that K-Match is considerably more effective against the robust active attack than
(k,ΓG,1)-adjacency anonymity. These results are particularly relevant in light of the fact
that (k,ΓG,1)-adjacency anonymity was until now the sole formal privacy property to pro-
vide non-negligible protection against the original active attack and some instances of the
robust active attack [27, 28]. Finally, the experiments shown here are the first ones where
the robust active attack leveraging dlog2 ne sybils is shown to be consistently thwarted by
anonymisation methods based on formal privacy properties. So far, this had only been
achieved via the addition of (large amounts of) random noise [28].
Regarding utility, both methods have a small impact on the overall similarities of the
degree distributions, as illustrated in Figure 6. This does not mean that the degrees are
not affected by the methods. In fact, both methods make most degrees increase, but in a
manner that does not significantly affect the ordering of vertices in terms of their degrees.
Regarding clustering coefficient-based utilities, we can observe in Figures 7 and 8 that the
superior effectiveness of K-Match does come at the price of a larger degradation in the
values of local and global clustering coefficients.
The main takeaway from the experimental results presented in this section is that our
refinement of the notion of re-identification probability for active adversaries has led to
identifying, for the first time, an anonymisation method satisfying two key properties: (i)
featuring a theoretically sound privacy guarantee against active attackers, and (ii) having
this privacy guarantee translate into effective resistance to the strongest active attack
reported so far, even when the attacker leverages a large number of sybil nodes.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced a new probabilistic interpretation of active re-identification attacks on
social graphs. This enables the privacy-preserving publication of social graphs in the pres-
ence of active adversaries by jointly preventing the attacker from unambiguously retrieving
the set of sybil nodes, and from using the sybil nodes for re-identifying the victims. Under
the new formulation, we have shown that the privacy property k-symmetry provides a suf-
ficient condition for the protection against active re-identification attacks. Moreover, we
have shown that a previously existing efficient algorithm, K-Match, provides a sufficient
condition for ensuring k-symmetry. Through a series of experiments, we have demon-
strated that our approach allows, for the first time, to publish anonymised social graphs
with formal privacy guarantees that effectively resist the robust active attack introduced
in [28], which is the strongest active re-identification attack reported in the literature, even
when it leverages a large number of sybil nodes.
The active adversary model addressed in this paper assumes that the (inherently dy-
namic) social graph is published only once. A more general scenario, where snapshots of
a dynamic social network are periodically published in the presence of active adversaries,
has recently been proposed in [7], and the robust active attack from [28] has been adapted
to benefit from this scenario. Our main direction for future work consists in leveraging our
17
methodology to propose anonymisation methods suited for this new publication scenario.
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Figure 5: Success rates of the robust active attack on the collections of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (left)
and Baraba´si-Albert (right) random graphs, with ` = 8 and k ∈ {2, 5, 8}.
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Figure 6: Degree distribution similarities on the collections of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (left) and
Baraba´si-Albert (right) random graphs, with ` = 8 and k ∈ {2, 5, 8}.
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Figure 7: Variations in global clustering coefficients on the collections of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (left)
and Baraba´si-Albert (right) random graphs, with ` = 8 and k ∈ {2, 5, 8}.
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Figure 8: Variations in averaged local clustering coefficients on the collections of Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi (left) and Baraba´si-Albert (right) random graphs, with ` = 8 and k ∈ {2, 5, 8}.
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A Appendix
It is claimed in [48] that every vertex v of a k-automorphic graph (see Definition 3) is
structurally indistinguishable from k − 1 other vertices ϕ1(v), ϕ2(v), . . . , ϕk−1(v).
Definition 3 (k-automorphism [48]). An automorphism is an isomorphism from a graph
to itself. Formally, an automorphism γ within a graph G = (V,E) is a bijective function
γ : V → V , such that ∀v1, v2 ∈ V : (v1, v2) ∈ E ⇐⇒ (γ(v1), γ(v2)) ∈ E. A graph G is said
to be k-automorphic if there exist k − 1 non-trivial automorphisms ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕk−1 of G
such that ϕi(v) 6= ϕj(v) for every v ∈ VG and every pair i, j satisfying 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k − 1.
u
v1
v2
v3 v4
v5
v6
v0 v10
Figure 9: A graph counterexample showing that k-automorphism does not achieve the
intended privacy protection.
However, a missing condition in Definition 3, namely requiring every ϕi to satisfy
ϕi(v) 6= v, invalidates this claim. Consider the graph shown in Figure 9. This graph
satisfies k-automorphism as defined in Definition 3, as can be verified by the existence
of the non-trivial automorphism γ = {(v1, v5), (v2, v6), (v3, v4), (u, u)}, yet the graph is
vulnerable even to the simplest structural attack, the degree-based attack, as vertex u is
the sole vertex with degree 2. It is worth noting that this limitation of k-automorphism
does not necessarily invalidate existing anonymisation methods. This is exemplified by
the K-Match algorithm itself, which does provide the intended protection because the
property it directly enforces is the so-called k different matches principle (see [48]), which
in turn is not equivalent to k-automorphism, but stronger.
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